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Introduction

A Comparative Analysis
of the NAFTA's
Environmental
Side Agreement
by Lynn A. Stanton

Labor and environmental concerns motivated the negotiation of side agreements to the North American Free Trade
Agreement Ihereinafter NAFTAj. Entitled "The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation between the
Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States, and the Government of the United States of
America," the environmental side agreement was signed on
September 14. 1993.1 Labor and environmental groups lobbied for extra environmental protections to be added to the
NAFTA because of perceived inadequacies in Mexico's environmental laws which they feared might create a pollution
haven 2 in the wake of free trade. A study done by the United
States Trade Representative showed that Mexico's environmental laws are 'fully equivalent" to the United States' environmental laws, but that there is a lack of effective enforcement.3 Enforcement of environmental laws has become the
focus of the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.
Environmental and labor groups may have good reason to
fear the environmental fallout from free trade between the
United States and Mexico given the appalling environmental degradation of the border area which resulted from the
free trade experiment, the Maquiladora program, between
Mexico and the United States.
The region's surface waters are veritable sewers,
thick with human feces and industrial toxins. The
subsurface water tables, upon which the arid region
is highly dependent for both human and industrial
consumption needs, are similarly compromised.
Toxic hot spots, areas where industrial and often
hazardous and/or toxic wastes have been disposed
of without regard for law or the environment, dot
the region's landscape.4
*Lynn Stanton is a I-D. Candidate. Spring 1995. University of California.
Hastings College of the Law; BA. with honors. University of California at
Berkeley. 1990. Thanks to Professor Naomi Roht-Anlaza and the I/EWsr-NorTHWEST
stafL.
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1.available in LEXIS. LEGIS Ubrary. DREXEC File. 1993 DER 175 d70 [hereInafter Agreement on Environmental Cooperation or Agreement].
2, The idea of a pollution haven is that environmental preuention and
clean up is expensive. itcompanies are given the choice between expensive regulatory costs in the US.. or selling to the U.S. market but not having to pay
these costs by moving to Mexico. then they wili choose the latter to the detriment of ecosystems as well as ceaner companies and American labor.
3. Set NAOo. Sc, & LW'r'L
A, Dri.. U S. GErt A c Or.. U.S. MrccoTR.F.
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remarked. "Mexico has a set of laws that are fully equivalent to what we have in
the United States: William K.Reilly. EPA Administrator. Remarks at a Meeting
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 23. 1992). But se: Tad Robberson. cd
omvr Trait Paat-To= Tco. WAs cro uaPosr. June 22. 1993. at Al (noting the lack
of ascrubber requirement for a Mexican power plant close to the U.S. border).
4 Robert Housman et at. Enfrreme en
r.J
nymnenal Lzas Unir a SuppLr'ntal AGrnunm. to tk North A'n.rfa:n FraTrat Agre ,ent. 5 GEO. INr'L EWTL. L
REv. 593. 595 (19931 (citations omitted).

Lynn A.Stanton
L .. S.ant.nVolume
Even more importance attaches to the Agreement given the likelihood that it will serve as the
model for other such agreements as the Clinton
Administration seeks to add South and Central
American partners to the NAFTA.
This Note will assess the likely effectiveness of
the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation to
implement better enforcement of domestic environmental laws in Mexico and will examine and
recommend alternative methods which might
achieve more effective enforcement. In Part I, the
background for environmental concerns over the
NAFTA will be examined by looking at the
Maquiladora program and also at Mexico's environmental laws and enforcement. In Part II, an indepth examination of the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation will focus on the side agreement's stance on private rights of action, the structure of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation [hereinafter CEC or Commission], and the
CEC's dispute resolution process. In Part Il, this
Note will examine other dispute resolution agreements in the environmental context to determine
what provisions are most effective in those agreements. In Part IV, recommendations are suggested
for more effective enforcement of environmental
laws in NAFTA countries.

Part I: The Background for
Environmental Concerns Over Free Trade
Mexico's environmental laws appear to have
failed to protect against degradation. 5 This failure is
especially evident at the border and strongly motivates worries about the NAFTA's effects on the environment. While it is beyond the scope of this Note
to examine Mexican environmental laws in great
detail, or even the means by which those laws are
enforced and the many theories as to why they fail,
at least some background is necessary to provide a
context for understanding the importance of the
concerns which motivated the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. The Maquiladora region is
a living example of these concerns. A glimpse of the
legal, political, and economic climate is essential to
5. See Houseman, supra note 4.
6. See Sherri M. Durand. 3 KAN. I. L. & PuB. PoL'Y 128, 129
(1994).
7. Stephen Lemer, Comment, The MaquiLadoras and Hazardous
Waste: The Effects Under NAFTA. 6 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 255, 257 (1993).
8. Michael Connor, Maquiladorasand the Environment: Prospectsfor
Moving from Agreements to Solutions, 3 CoLO. 1. INT'L. ENvnL. L. & PoL'Y
683, 683 (1992).
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an understanding of the impediments to Mexican
domestic environmental law effectiveness.
A.The Maquiladora Experiment
Maquiladora comes from the Spanish verb
maquilar, meaning to perform a task for another. 6 A
Maquiladora is a factory which makes goods pursuant to a free trade treaty experiment between the
United States and Mexico which was signed in 1971.7

The treaty allows American-owned factories located
in Mexico to import raw materials into Mexico without paying duties and then export a finished or partly finished product back to the United States, 8 The
goods they produce are subject to a United States
customs duty, payable on export, based only on the
value added to the product outside the country-in
this case, the foreign labor.9 The treaty promoted
what was perceived as a mutually beneficial arrangement: the Mexicans get jobs, the foreign factory owners get cheap labor, and Americans get inexpensive
goods. These factories are owned primarily by Americans, although some are owned by Japanese. Since
its inception in 1971, the program has grown explosively: it started with twelve plants employing roughly 3,000 workers; by its twentieth anniversary in 1991,
the program boasted 1,936 plants with almost
500,000 employees.1 0
While the Maquiladora program has enjoyed
great short-term economic success, the environmental degradation it has caused has brought
attention to the dangers of free trade programs."
The American Medical Association [hereinafter
AMA] described the border region, where large
numbers of the Maquiladoras are located, as a "virtual cesspool and breeding ground for infectious
disease." 2 The report went further, finding that
"luincontrolled air and water pollution is rapidly
deteriorating and seriously affecting the health and
future economic vitality on both sides of the border."' 3 There are two obvious explanations for what
is causing the environmental degradation: I) the
Maquiladoras improperly dispose of their hazardous wastes; and 2) the "colonias," the shanty
towns which spring up around Maquiladoras, have
improper 4and inadequate water and sanitation
facilities."
9. Id.at 686.
10. Id.
1i. See Houseman, supra note 4 and Satchell, Infra note 12,
12. Michael Satchell, Poisoning the Border, U.S. NEWs AND WouL
REPonr, May 6, 1991, at 32.
13. Id.
14. Connor, supra note 8. at 697.
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Mexican regulations require that hazardous
wastes be returned to their country of origin."5
Despite this requirement, in 1988, only 7 out of 748
Maquiladoras requested shipment of hazardous
waste back into the United States. 16 In 1990, the
17
total number of requests rose to eighty-five.
According to one report by the Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia ihereinafter SEDUE, the
Mexican equivalent of the United States Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPAII, 52% of
Maquiladoras generate hazardous wastes, but only
30% have complied with regulations requiring information to be provided to SEDUE about disposal of
these wastes, and only 19% are complying with
waste disposal laws. 18 A California Regional Water
Quality Control Board report done on the New
River, which originates south of Mexicali, crosses
the border, and empties into the Salton Sea near a
National Wildlife Refuge,' 9 gives strong evidence of
improper disposal of hazardous wastes. 20 The report
found evidence of numerous industrial chemicals
and fifteen viruses capable of causing cholera,
dysentery, hepatitis, meningitis, polio, and
typhoid. 2' A study done by the National Toxics
Campaign Fund in 1990 showed that toxic organic
chemicals were being discharged from industrial
plants at levels which violate both EPA and Mexican
standards. 22 Water samples from sixteen of twentytwo locations violated both Mexican and United
23
States water quality standards.
The other environmental problem is the colonias. Colonias have sprung up on both sides of the
border. 24 They have brought with them increases in
disease caused by a lack of potable water and inadequate sanitation facilities. 25 The incidence of hepatitis in border areas like that between El Paso and
Brownsville in Texas is six times the national average.26 In the El Paso colonia of San Elizario, 85% to
27
90% of adults contract hepatitis by age thirty-five.

15. I. at 695.
16. I.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. d. at 695-696.
20. d.
21. Id.
22. Satchell. supra note 12. at 40.
23. I.
24. Connor. supra note 8. at 697.
25. I.
26. Satchell. supra note 12. at 41.
27.1.

B. Mexican Environmental Law and Enforcement
Mexican environmental laws greatly resemble
those of the United States, because Mexico's 1988
General Law for Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection [hereinafter the 1988 lawl was
modeled on United States environmental statutes
and regulations.28
Most significantly, hazardous waste is
specifically defined and follows closely the
U.S. guidelines related to corrosivity, reactivity, toxicity, and ignitability. In addition.
requirements for documenting (i.e. manifesting) shipments of hazardous wastes are
delineated, Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) on new projects are mandated,
and no hazardous waste is allowed to be
imported into Mexico unless the waste can
be recycled or reused in Mexico. 29
The 1988 law was a reaction to Mexico's 1982
Federal Environmental Law and its 1984 Amendments which failed to provide any definitions or
require any strong enforcement by SEDUE. 30 The
inadequacies of the 1982 law resulted in environmental degradation and led to an amendment to the
Mexican Constitution in 1987 which gave the government the right to impose measures on private
owners for benefits to the public interest and ecological balance.3' The 1988 law provides concrete
guidelines and criminal and administrative sanctions for failure to comply with regulations regarding hazardous materials.32 SEDUE issues technical
standards, and the government (federal, state, or
3
local) may impose sanctions for non-compliance
Tort law is available as an alternative to criminal or administrative sanctions in Mexico under the
Mexican Civil Code.34 Liability is based on a standard similar to the reasonable person duty in U.S.
tort law. 3' Mexican tort liability, however, is restricted by statute.36 For instance, damages are limited;
28 Connor. supra note 8. quoting General Law for Ecological
Equilibuium and Environmental Protection. DL.o OcLk. c LASEDEpi:Os (DO), lan. 28. 1988.
29. Connor. supra note 8. at 692 (citations emitted).

30. U at 691
31. 11 (quoting Vex. Const. art. 27).
32 Connor. supra note 8.at 692.
33. hL
pA-A EL EsrAno uNins Mnci.r;o
34. L at 693. See c:-o Cm,.
(CCDT.); Co:oo Cr,u. (for each state) (Mex).
35 Se: Daniel L Basurto Gonzales & Elaine Flud Rodriguez.
Entimnw1lAsrccftauitibraOpmrtans:A Not o CauffonforU.S.

Parent Corprathns. 22 ST. ?,Wsrs L. 659.677 (1991).

36 Set supra note 28.
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one cannot receive compensation for mental
anguish or loss of consortium, and no punitive
damages may be assessed.3 7 Also, no class actions
or contingent fee arrangements are available under
Mexican law, making such suits unrewarding and
difficult to finance.3 8
Despite the many similarities between Mexican
environmental laws and United States environmental laws, their effectiveness is far from similar. The
ineffectiveness of Mexican environmental laws as
compared to the United States' laws arises in part
from the lack of money available to SEDUE for
enforcement. SEDUE's budget is $0.48 per capita,
while United States expenditures for environmental
protection are $24.40 per capita.3 9 Such a limited
budget provides enormous challenges to environmental law enforcement in Mexico.
Mexico's political climate also seems to discourage the enforcement of its environmental laws. Both
citizens and scientists appear to be actively deterred
from pursuing enforcement of environmental laws
and information about environmental law violations.
One example of this is Carmen Hernandez de
Vasquez, former head of the Tijuana civil protection
office, who was warned, then fired, while investigating a toxic waste site owned by a United States
firm. 40 She was told that her investigations and public-awareness campaigns were "alarming" the citizenry. 41 Many other Mexican environmental critics have
alleged that they too are being pressured to keep
quiet by threats of firings and funding cuts. 42
Private citizens are also discouraged from complaining. Not only is little information made available to them, but there is a "Big Brother"-like pressure brought to bear on those who complain. For
example, ABC's Primetine Live television news team
followed a group of residents of a Maquiladora
region in Matamoras, Mexico, as they went to
SEDUE to complain about rampant dumping of hazardous chemicals in their neighborhood. 43 The
SEDUE official promised to get back to the group in
three days. 44 Three days later, the official refused to
allow the news team into the interview, but a
woman who talked to the official reported that the
official admitted fo accusing the group of being "for37. Connor. supra note 8, at 693.
38. Richard Vaznaugh, Note, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction-Environmental Muscle for the North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 HAS NGS
INT'L & CoMp. L. Ray. 207, 215 (1993).

eign agents" and telling them that they were all
4
under investigation. '
Given this climate, practitioners will find it difficult to gather information, find citizens who are
willing to bring suit, or recover much in damages
against a Maquiladora. Many Maquiladoras further
protect themselves by investing very little in their
Mexican factories, so that little is at risk from
suits. 6 Even if a successful claim is made in Mexico, insufficient capital holdings in Mexico will create the need for additional litigation in the United
States to make the judgment enforceable against
47
the American parent corporation.

Part II: The Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation
The Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
creates the Commission for Environmental Cooperation. 48 The actions taken by the CEC, and its accessibility to members of the public, may play a significant role in arbitrating disputes over the environment and negotiating change in each country's
laws. To assess the likely effectiveness of the Agreement, an in-depth analysis of the CEC and the provisions of the Agreement is necessary.
A. The Commission for Environmental Cooperation
The CEC provides a forum for dispute resolution regarding environmental matters. The Commission is composed of three parts: a Council, a Secre49
tariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.
I. The Council
The main task of the Council is to oversee the
implementation of the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation and to make recommendations
regarding pollution control technology, data gathering, protection of flora and fauna, eco-labelling,
emergency preparedness, and stronger pollution
control laws, as well as other concerns.5 0 The Council is made up of cabinet-level representatives (or
designees) from each member country Ihereinafter
country or countries] and conducts public meetings
(transcript available in LEXIS. NEXIS Library. ABCNEWS file).
44. Id.
45. Id.

39. Satchell, supra note 12, at 36.

46. Vaznaugh, supra note 38,at 217.

40. Vaznaugh, supra note 38, at 219.

47. Id.

41. Id.

48. See supra note 1.

42. Id.

49. Id.

43. Primetime Live, (ABC television broadcast). Apr. 1. 1993

50. Id.art. 10, § 2.
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at least once a year and additional meetings at the
request of any member country.Y The Council works
on a consensus basis, except in cases of enforcement challenges and other specified areas, where a
two-thirds majority is required.
2. The Secretariat
The Secretariat provides "technical, adminis2
trative, and operational support to the Council."*
The Secretariat prepares an annual report for the
Commission covering the actions member countries have taken to fulfill their obligations under
the Agreement, including data on domestic
enforcement of laws, information submitted by
non-governmental organizations, and any matter
referred to the Secretariat by the Council. The Secretariat may investigate any matter on its own initiative, except domestic enforcement of environmental laws. The Council may veto any investigation by the Secretariat with a two-thirds majority.
The Secretariat is run by an Executive Director, a
position which rotates between nationals of each
53
country.
3. The Joint Public Advisory Committee
The Joint Public Advisory Committee is the
Council's source for technical and scientific information. 54 The Committee consists of fifteen members (unless the Council decides otherwise) with
equal numbers from each country. The Committee
provides advice to the Council and to the Secretariat upon request. 55
B. The Process of Dispute Resolution in the
Commission
Dispute resolution is the main function of the
CEC. The dispute resolution process provides a
forum for resolution of enforcement problems with
a member country, such as Mexico. Since there are
stiff penalties for failing to abide by the arbitrated
result,56 the hope is that this process may succeed
in encouraging enforcement of domestic environmental laws in each country. However, the process
is long and requires not only that a member country file a complaint calling for the initiation of an
51. Id. art. 9, §§ 1. 4. Annual meetings are publi. The addi.
tional meetings are public only if the Council decides that they
should be. Id.art 9. § 4.

arbitration panel but also that another country join
the request. 7
If a dispute arises, the complaining country
may request consultations with the complained-of
country to attempt to resolve the dispute."8 If consultations fails, within sixty days of the request for
consultations, a party may request a special session
of the Council.' 9 The Council may then offer advice,
mediate, or create working groups to attempt to
resolve the dispute.P0 However, if the matter is not
resolved within sixty days, a consulting party may
request an arbitral panel. 6' With approval of twothirds of the Council, a panel is convened from an
existing roster to consider whether there is a "persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained
against to effectively enforce its environmental
laws "62 and whether this failure affects goods or services that are traded between the countries or are in
competition with goods or services of the complaining country. 63 There are several obstacles to
successful implementation of this process. For
instance, a failure to achieve a two-thirds majority
vote in the Council would halt the process before an
arbitral panel was ever formed. Also, even if the
panel is convened, it may not have enough evidence
to support a finding of a persistent pattern of failure
to enforce environmental laws on the part of the
complained-of country. Further, it may be difficult
to establish a direct connection between the persistent pattern of failed enforcement and an effect on
goods or services in another country. These factors
place an onerous burden on a complaining country
and might, in some cases, discourage complaints.
When a panel is convened, it issues a final
report.6 If the parties do not agree on an implementation plan consistent with that report within
sixty days, the panel may be reconvened for the pur6
pose of deciding on an implementation plan. 5 If
the parties do not agree that an implementation
plan is being properly implemented 180 days after
the plan is established or approved, the panel may
again be reconvened. 6 If the panel agrees that the
plan is not being fully implemented, it may impose
a monetary enforcement assessment against the
country found to be in violation; the assessment
58- U
59. Ud.

52. d. art. 11. § 5.

60-11i

53. Id.

61-11.

54. Id.art. 16.

62 U ar 22.§ I.

55. Id.

63. U art 24

56. Id.Annex 34.

64-1.

57. Id.art 34. § 1.

65 l art 34.§ I
66- Uart 3.4§

and 3

Volume 2,Numbo I

LymnA. Stanton

may not exceed twenty million dollars (U.S.) for the
first year of the agreement.6 7 The money received
from such an assessment is paid into a fund, which
is used to "improve or enhance the environment or
environmental enforcement in the [country] complained against."68 An order for an assessment
against Canada is filed in a domestic court of Canada which will enforce the collection of the assessment without opportunity for appeal.6 9 Ifthe United
States or Mexico fails to pay an assessment within
180 days, the complaining country may suspend the
benefits of the free trade agreement to impose tar70
iffs sufficient to collect the assessment.
A private interested party may complain to the
Secretariat, in writing, with proper documentation,
of an alleged persistent failure by a member country
to enforce environmental laws. The most that will
result from such a private complaint is the compilation of a factual record.7 ' The factual record, however, cannot be compiled without a two-thirds majority vote of the Council.7 2 Another two-thirds majority
73
vote is required to make the factual record public.

C.Private Right of Action
The successful enforcement of environmental
laws in the United States is due in great part to suits
initiated by private parties, such as environmentalists and industry members, who challenge interpretations of regulations and force regulatory agencies
to take action.7 4 The Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation requires only a small protection of the
private right of action in enforcement of environmental laws.
Article 6 of the Agreement requires each country to "ensure that persons with a legally recognized
interest under its law" have access to the courts and
administrative proceedings of that country.7 5 In the
United States, where most environmental laws provide for a private right of action, this provision
almost certainly effects no change. Since the language of this article only requires access for those
with a legally recognized interest, there is no man-

date to change laws to allow non-citizens to sue.76

Similarly, Mexico will not be required under
this provision to open up its courts to American
parties who might wish to challenge a lack of
enforcement. Article 6 sets out no suggested goals
or recommended standards to determine what
interests ought to be "legally recognized." However,
the article does specify the types of rights and
remedies that ought to be available in the courts
and proceedings, including injunctions, damages,
77
and enforcement orders.
Article 7 guarantees some procedural rights in
the trial or hearing. The member countries are to
ensure "fair[,J open[,J and equitable" proceedings,
by complying with "due process of law," opening
hearings to the public whenever possible, allowing
the presentation of evidence, and avoiding unreasonable delay, complications, or excessive fees.7 8
Opinions shall be in writing and made available to
79
the public.

Article 10 briefly addresses the notion of a right
of action for citizens of a NAFTA country who are
not citizens of the complained-of country. 80 As the
Agreement stands, there is no assurance that any
such system for cross-border suits will be developed. The idea of a cross-border citizen suit is relegated to "consideration" by the Council. 8' The
Council is to consider the issue and make a recommendation on such suits "as appropriate."82 The
cross-border citizen suit might be the best way to
ensure enforcement of environmental laws, because
United States environmental groups are already
skilled at, and well-funded for, such efforts. Further,
any corruption or political pressure on citizens in
Mexico would discourage these suits. Since United
States citizens are more removed from these pressures, they would be less likely to be deterred from
filing and prosecuting suits.
D. Summary
The Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
appears to allow for almost no citizen intervention

67. Id.Annex 34, § 1.

art. 6, § 2.

68. Id.Annex 34, § 3.

76. On the other hand, section 304 of the Clean Air Act provides a private right of action for non-citizens: "any person may
commence a civil action" and "Itlhe district courts shall have Jurisdiction, without regard to the citizenship of the parties," 42 U.SC, §
7604 (a) (West 1992).
77. Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1,
art. 6. § 3.

69. Id.Annex 36A.
70. Id.art. 36, § 2.
71. Id.art. 14.
72. Id.
73. Id.art. 15, § 7.
74. See generally, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 411 F.
Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus. 412 U.S. 541
(1973). Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
75. Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note I,

78. Id.art. 7.
79. Id.
80. Id.art. 10.
81. Id.
82. Id.art. 10, § 9.
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or meaningful input. There are only two possible
inroads for private citizens or groups to access the
CEC. First, the groups or citizens may attempt to
influence their country's representative on the
Council. Even if the representative for the United
States is swayed by such influence, that representative would then need to influence another country's
representative (Canada's representative in the case
of a complaint against Mexico) to make it past the
stage of mere consultations with the complained-of
country.83 This is a significant barrier. The other
potential inroad to the CEC is through the Secretariat, to whom anyone may file a complaint with
proper documentation.8 4 However, the complaint
will go no further unless two of the three member
countries agree to gather more information regarding the complaint. 85 Both of these approaches
require significant lobbying of two governmentsno small task by any reading.

Part III: Alternative Methods of Environmental
Treaties and Agreements
While a number of treaties and agreements
have been formed to attempt to resolve transboundary environmental problems, most have
failed to be very effective. Most of these treaties
have required parties to agree to vague declarations
on the importance of the environment and have
relied on the good faith of the parties to follow
through on these declarations "as appropriate. 8 6
Unfortunately, the ubiquitous presence of words
like "as appropriate" and the lack of any enforcement mechanism have left parties unable to require
any action by other parties.
There do exist a few environmental treaties or
agreements which are notable for having achieved a
modicum of success. Generally they have achieved
this success by setting specific requirements with
avenues for enforcement. A few of these treaties will
be examined for methods which might be applied to
the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.

83. Id.art. 34. § 1
84. Id.art. 15. § 2.
85. Id.art 15.§7.
86. See infra notes 87-89.
87. Convention on the Protection of the Environment. Fed. 19.
1974. Den.-Fin.-Nor.-Swed., art. 3. 13 I.L.M. 591. 591-97.
88. I.
89. Id.

Fall
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A.The Nordic Convention
The Nordic Convention of 1974 [hereinafter
Conventioni took a unique approach to environmental remedies by opening up its domestic court
system to non-citizens who are citizens of a signatory country.8 7 Sweden. Finland, Denmark, and Norway agreed to principles of equal access and nondiscrimination. Non-citizens are given the same
access to courts for litigation of claims against polluters. Further, the non-citizen is given treatment
equal to that which a citizen might receive. The
Convention provides that "any person who is affected or may be affected by a nuisance caused by environmentally harmful activities in another Contracting State"8 may bring that action before the court of
that country "on the same terms as a legal entity of
the State in which such actions are being carried
out."8 9 Of course, since only four countries are party
to this Convention, the effectiveness is limited.
Other efforts expanding the right of cross-border citizen suits have not been as effective as the
Nordic Convention. In 1976. the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development [hereinafter OECDI issued a recommendation for"Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and
Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier
Pollution. "9 To date, the recommendation has not
achieved much success.91 The United States and
Canada entered into the 1rransboundary Pollution
Reciprocal Access Act (hereinafter United StatesCanada Act or Act) to give reciprocal equal access
for victims of transboundary pollution. 2 However,
this Act has only been ratified by a handful of states
and provinces within the two countries.93 It may
very well be that, should the Council of the CEC
decide to adopt a recommendation as to reciprocal
access to the courts, such a recommendation would
meet with the same lack of enthusiasm as did the
OECD's recommendation and the United StatesCanada Act. The carrot of a free trade package might
have been sufficient inducement to create a reciprocal right of action, but now there is not as much
bargaining power, since the free trade package is
already a fait accompli.

90. Implementation of a Regime of Equal Right of Access and
Non-DiscrimInation In Relation to Transfrontier Pollution. aaloWL
In WESTLAW. INTLENVL Database. 1977 WL 33422.
91. David S. Rubinton. Tc¢arI a Regnfflon of the Rights of NonStates In Inter aItoril Enronrmental Law. 9 PAce ENTL L Ray. 475
(1992).
92- 9B. U.LA 625 (1982),
93- Sw Atrmn Rosencranz. The Uniform Transfoundary Pollution
Rirprmal Atess A t. 15 E rn.. PcL 105 (1985),
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B. The Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol Ihereinafter Protocoll
was negotiated under the Vienna Convention in
94
1987 to address the problem of ozone depletion. It
has been hailed as one of the most effective international treaties. 9' This is due, in large part, to its
effective use of trade incentives. 96 The Protocol bans
parties from trade in ozone-depleting chemicals
with non-parties to the Protocol. 97 Since most of the
developed countries are parties to the Protocol,
countries that would like to trade in such chemicals
have strong incentives to sign the Protocol. Further,
the Protocol sets up a fund (the Multilateral fund),
which, among other things, aids developing countries in meeting the demands of the Protocol. 98
If the Protocol fails in any respect, it is in the
provision of effective enforcement. If non-compliance is complained of, there is a process of dispute
resolution which involves making a complaint to
the Secretariat of the Vienna Convention. The party
complained-of then responds to the complaint, and
the information is forwarded to an Implementation
Committee. 99 The Implementation Committee
makes a report of its findings to the Meeting of the
Parties for implementation of the decision. 100 However, if a party chooses not to implement the decision, there is nothing more that can be done. Further, there is no effective method for assessing
whether countries are meeting the reduction
requirements (for reducing the use of ozone depleting chemicals). Since countries do their own reporting of the base level and any reduction, such numbers may be suspect.' 0'
C. United States Domestic Negotiated Rulemaking
Negotiated rulemaking was developed in
response to dissatisfaction with notice and comment procedures in federal agency rulemaking
under the Administrative Procedures Act. 102 The traditional rulemaking processes have been criticized
for being too adversarial and for inappropriately
grafting judicial processes onto a quasi-legislative,
policy-making process. 03 Negotiated rulemaking
94. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Sept. 16 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987). [hereinafter Protocoll
95. See Houseman, supra note 4, at 553.
96. id.
97. See Protocol, supra note 94, at art. 4.
98. Id.art. 10.
99. Third Meeting of the Parties of the Montreal Protocol on
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment Programme, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL. Pro. 3/11 (June 21, 1991).
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allows interested parties to a federal rule to negotiate a mutually acceptable rule. 04 Each party can
individually weigh the different policy choices and
make trade-offs in the negotiation process based on
the relative value of one policy over another,' 05 This
ensures a better representation of actual interests In
the rulemaking process. The negotiations tend to be
successful, because the threat of a rule developed
under the traditional procedure acts as an incentive
to reaching agreement. 06 Several federal agencies
have successfully used negotiated rulemaking. For
instance, the EPA has used negotiated rulemaking
to develop proposed rules on non-conformance
penalties for vehicle emissions and on emergency
07
exemptions from pesticide regulations.
Participants in the negotiated rulemaking procedure are selected by giving notice to the known
interested parties. Others are allowed to join based
upon whether their interest might give rise to standing to challenge the rule in court.1 08 By including
anyone who might be able to challenge the rule, the
agency can avoid many lengthy court battles and
assures that the negotiations are meaningful.
Many of the concepts of negotiated rulemaking
are incorporated into international treaties. For
instance, as previously discussed under the Montreal Protocol, in the event of a dispute, an Implementation Committee is impanelled to facilitate a
consensual agreement between the parties, but
with the threat that the dispute will be submitted to
a Meeting of the Parties if a consensus is not
reached. 109 This may not be effective, because the
parties may make diplomatic, though environmentally undesirable, compromises. Nevertheless, it at
least motivates a discussion of solutions.
D. The Canada-U.S. Air Quality Agreement
and the International Joint Commission
The friendly relationship between the United
States and Canada has been responsible in large
part for the successes in negotiating agreements
over transboundary issues, such as pollution and
water boundaries, because many of these agree102. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1992). See
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 74 GEo. L. 1. 1625 (1986).
103. Perritt.supra note 102.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.

100. Id.

108. Id.

101. Id.

109. Id.
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ments rely on voluntary negotiations to work out disputes." 0 In the 1991 Canada-United States Agreement on Air Quality Ihereinafter Agreement on Air
Qualityl, if a dispute arises over the interpretation of
the Agreement on Air Quality, the parties first enter
into consultations and, in the event consultation
fails, next consider whether to submit the dispute to
the International Joint Commission Ihereinafter
IICI.'" For disputes over other issues, however, the
parties must consult, and if that fails, they must
.refer the matter to an appropriate third party.f" 2
What gives these consultations a likelihood of success is the transparency' 13 and availability of the
progress reports made by the two countries. The
Agreement on Air Quality also requires the Bilateral
Air Quality Committee (with three members from
each country) to prepare progress reports every two
years." 4 These reports are given to each country, as
well as to the IIC and the public." 5 The IIC invites
comments on the reports (making use of public
hearings), reviews the information, and puts together a record of the comments which is then released
to the public." 6 This provides a check on the accuracy of reports made by the countries' representatives
17
and gives the public access to the documents."
By requiring public disclosure of the progress
each party is making, the Agreement on Air Quality
allows citizens to put pressure on their governments to make changes, and consultations are thus
encouraged. This transparency also promotes accurate reporting.

Part IV. Recommendations
A. Citizen Suit Provisions
While the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation takes a step in the right direction by requiring the opening of courts to some individuals to sue,
a cross-border citizen suit provision is still needed.
The Agreement does not ensure a right to sue to
individuals who are citizens of either the complained-of country or another member country. Any
member country is free to place burdensome restric110. For example, the Boundary Waters Treaty prohibits pollution of boundary waters, but the International joint Commission
may only make recommendations on compliance disputes, unless
both countries submit to binding arbitration, which they have
neverdone. Boundary Waters Treaty. Jan. 11. 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit.. 36
Stat. 2448.

tions to recognizing a right of action for citizen or
non-citizen suits. Ensuring a right of action to citizens would not be enough on its own if citizens fear
that corruption of the system may put their lives or
liberty in danger by exercising that right. Since United States citizens have great experience and
resources, and as there is a long history in the United States of suits to enforce environmental laws, a
cross-border citizen suit provision would greatly
enhance environmental law enforcement efforts.
The Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
would be more effective if it included provisions
requiring domestic rights of action for those who
can show an injury from failure to enforce environmental laws. Further, the Agreement should incorporate a cross-border citizen suit option, such as
that contained in the Nordic Convention. With that
example of a workable system available, it should
not be difficult to achieve a workable model for the
NAFTA countries. This would then allow citizen
action to address any particular failure to enforce
domestic environmental laws (as opposed to the
weighty burden of proving a "persistent failure" as
required under the CEC) and deter pollution by giving injured parties the right to seek tort damages in
many cases.
B. Transparency
Transparency allows citizen groups to learn the
facts of a problem and lobby for a particular outcome through public opinion pressure. There are
some measures in the Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation which may give onlookers information
about the facts available to, and actions taken by,
the CEC. For example, the Secretariat's annual
report, including assessments of the state of the
environment of each member country, must be
released publicly. This will aid the public's participation in assessing the validity of progress as
reported by nations and also encourage citizen pressure on governments through disclosure of the environmental status of each country. However, greater
transparency in the process would give the consultation requirements more effectiveness, would allow
112 Supra note IlIL
113. The term *transparency' Is used to indicate a process
whereby reports and findings are available to the public so that the
public may be informed about the state of disputed matters.
114 See supra note I 1I.

111. Agreement on Air Quality, Mar. 13. 1991. art. XII. US,-

115 Md

Can.. 30 LLM. 676. The IlC was established by the Boundary\Waters

116 if

Treaty. See supra note 110. The IJC is available to make recommendations on transboundary pollution problems between the United
States and Canada, but its recommendations are not binding.

117 Se ger.featly. leffrey L Roelofs. United Stats-CanadaAir
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LI 421 (1993)
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for more extensive citizen participation, and would
be of aid to other aspects of the Agreement.
Currently, allegations of failure to enforce environmental laws may be made by private citizens,
but a report will result only if two-thirds of the
member countries allow it to be prepared. Then, a
further two-thirds vote is necessary to make the
report public. Instead, a report should be prepared
whenever the Secretariat finds that the allegations
meet the criteria in Article 14. The resulting report
should always be made public. This record should
then be considered by the Council. If one member
of the Council, or both the Secretariat and the joint
Public Advisory Committee (by a majority vote),
decide that the report shows evidence of a failure to
enforce environmental laws, then the dispute resolution process, with mandatory arbitration at the
end, should be invoked.
Transparency would also allow the public to
participate in the process of monitoring environmental law enforcement. Breaches in enforcement
could then be dealt with, notwithstanding any possible diplomatic implications inherent in initiation
of the dispute resolution process. An increase in
pressure on member countries to achieve more
effective enforcement of environmental laws will
almost certainly benefit the environment.
C.Negotiated Rulemaking
The Agreement would be improved by
increased participation at the consultation stage
such as occurs during negotiated rulemaking.
According private rights of action to domestic citizens and citizens of other member countries would
likely increase enforcement, as well as participation
in the dispute resolution process. Although consultations are required if a dispute arises under the
current Agreement, the consultations only involve
the two member countries. Such negotiated settlements are therefore subject to challenge in court by
anyone who was injured by an enforcement failure.
Greater representation and participation of interested parties in the consultation process will
decrease the likelihood of a successful court challenge and encourage better advocacy of environmental issues. Although compromise may be more
difficult between more parties, it would be in the
best interest of resolution of a dispute to adopt the
inclusive approach characteristic of negotiated
rulemaking. By bringing in other interested parties
early on in the process-thus increasing public participation-the ability to formulate an environmentally sound solution would be strengthened. Additionally, transparency of proceedings is likely to
increase public pressure, while the threat of the

arbitration panel is likely to give incentive to effective negotiation.
Conclusion
The Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
has many strong provisions, such as the sanctions
for lack of enforcement, the transparency of some
procedures, and the requirement of consultations.
However, much of this may not be effective without
needed additions. Sanctions may never be reached
with a strict two-country majority requirement for
action, and no domestic enforcement by private
suit may be possible. The Agreement needs a
requirement that a cross-border citizen suit agreement between the member countries be reached.
The dispute resolution process would be much
improved if the Secretariat were empowered to
investigate legitimate complaints from member
countries and make the record public. The Agreement shows much promise in encouraging techniques such as public input and participation,
transparency of records, consultations with the
threat of arbitration, and private rights of action.
But encouragement is not enough. The Agreement
needs provisions which will guarantee that legitimate complaints of failure to enforce environmental laws made by consumer groups and industry
will also be investigated, and that actions will be
taken based on the findings of those investigations.
The Agreement on Environ-mental Cooperation
will have to evolve and strengthen if it is truly to
protect our global environment.
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Agreement on Air Quality, Can.-U.S.. Mar. 13, 1991.
art. XJI, 30 1.L.M. 676.

Agreement that transboundary air pollution causes significant environmental harm and that air pollution can effectively be reduced through cooperative or coordinated action.
Establishes both general and specific air quality objectives.
Also establishes procedures for assessment, notification. mitigation. exchange of information, review, consultations, referrals. and settlements of disputes.

Michael Connor, Maquiladoras and the Environr,ent:
Prospects for Moving from Agreements to Solutions, 3
COLO. 1. INVL ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 683 (1992).
Evaluates the industrial situation and environmental effects
created at the US-Mexico border and analyzes possible remedies for border citizens. Provides (1) historical background on
the maquiladora (assembly plant) program and the present
state of the environmental agreements between the United
States and Mexico. as well as the applicable domestic legal
authority within each country. (2) evidence of the deteriorating environmental situation and discusses some of the problems in the system as it now exists, and (3) a discussion of
possible short-term solutions and the prospect of the proposed Free Trade Agreement providing a more long-term remedy.

must become mutually reinforcing so that environmental
policies do not distort trade flovs and economic activities do
not continue in an unsound and unsustainable manner. Considers competitive sustainability as the means for achieving
sustainable development and finds that an international sstem of Incentives and disincentives will create a mutually
reinforcing mechanism for directing trade and environmental
policies towmard Improving the worldvide standard of living.

Henry H. Perritt. Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recommendations by the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEO. L.j. 1625 (1986).
Examines negotiated rulemaking and deems it a realistic
altemathe to adversarial administrative procedures. Covers
the evolution of the negotiated rulemaking concept, conceptual models dravn from political science and dispute resolution negotiation, some examples of negotiations and future
agency plans with respect to negotiated rulemaking. malor
legal Issues affecting future use of negotiated rulemaking and
the basis for the 1935 Administrative Conference of the United States recommendations.

Jeffrey L. Roelofs, United States-Canada Air Quality
Agreement: A Frameork for Addressing Transboundary Air Pollution Problems. 26 CORNELL IN'l. L.J. 421
(1993).

Agreement finding an urgent need to protect and improve the
environment Provides that persons may question the permissibility of environmentally harmful activities In an appropriate court or administrative agency. Including the issue of
measures to prevent damage and to appeal court or administrative decisions.

Anal es the United States-Canada Air Ouality Agreement
and posits that the agreement sets up a comprehensive
framesork in which both countries can effectively address
problem;of transboundaxy air pollution. Des aibesthe nature
and scope of the acid rain problem; surveys past bilateral.
multilateral. and domestic attempts to address the problem;
and determines that such elforts were Ineffective. Discusses
negotiations and difficulties encountered in reaching agreement and examines the resulting agreement, deeming it a
success

Daniel I. Basurto Gonzales & Elaine Flud Rodriguez,
Environmental Aspects of Maquiladora Operations:A

David S. Rubinton, Toward a Recognition of the Rights of
Non-States in International Environmental Law, 9

Note of Caution for U.S. Parent Corporations, 22 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 659, 677 (1991).
Examines the status of various Mexican laws and regulations
addressing environmental concerns as they pertain to assembly plant operations in Mexico and the current political climate as it relates to the meaningful enforcement of such laws
and regulations. Explores the potential liability of United
States parent corporations for the -environmental sins" of a
Mexican assembly plant subsidiary under laws in both Mexico and the United States.

Traces the movement away from the traditional state-centered view of international environmental protection. Dlscusses the history of the non-state party in numerous international and domestic forums. including the International
Court of justice. and examines the recent changes which have
increased the power of non-state interests despite the
absence of an absolute right for non-state actors to initiate
environmental claims within the International forum.

Convention on the Protection of the Environment
Between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, Feb. 19, 1974, art. 3, 13 I.L.M. 591-97.

Robert Housman et al., Enforcement of Environmental
Laws Under a Supplemental Agreement to the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 5 GEO. INT'L ENvrL.
L. REV. 593 (1993).
Focuses on the enforcement approach advocated by the Center for International Environmental Law and the Defenders of
Wildlife. Sets forth the enforcement proposals promulgated
by the govemments of the three Parties. the U.S. Congress.
and by the environmental community. Analyzes the two basic
approaches to enforcement found in these proposals, condluding with suggestions for the most effective ways to incorporate environmental enforcement provisions in the NAFFA
side agreements.

Robert F. Housman & Durwood 1. Zaelke, Making
Trade and Environmental Policies Mutually Reinforcing: Forging Competitive Sustainability, 23 ENvL. L.
545, 553 (1993).
Argues that environmental and international trade policies

PAce ENvnm L. REv. 475 (1992).

Richard Vaznaugh. ExtraterritorialJurisdiction-Environmental Muscle for the North American Fre Trade
Agreement, 17 HASnNGS INTL & COMP. L. REv. 207,
215 (1993).
This Note was published as the NAFTA was being passed; itis
somewhat prospective In its analysis. It examines the
NAFTA's potentially dire erironmental effect., and analyzes
extraterritorial environmental regulation, offering itas a highly effective yet controversial solution to Mexico's poor environmental regulatory structure. Asserts that if environmental
deterioration along the Mexican border persists, extraterritorial jurisdiction remains a solution to the regulatory imbalance between the United States and Mexico.

